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INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION, 
POWER, STATES, AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
Frank J. Garcia* 
Abstract: On October 12, 2012 the Boston College Law Review and the Bos-
ton College International and Comparative Law Review held a joint Sympo-
sium entitled, “Filling Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order.” In 
three panel discussions and a keynote address by Anne-Marie Slaughter, a 
lively discourse on the impact of globalization on state power, the law, and 
the law’s ability to both reallocate and effectively restrain power ensued. 
This Introduction, and the works that follow in this symposium issue, 
document that discourse. 
Introduction 
 Welcome to this Symposium, “Filling Power Vacuums in the New 
Global Legal Order,” a joint issue (and effort) of the Boston College Law 
Review and the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review.1 
The underlying premise of the Symposium is that globalization is reallo-
cating power—political power, economic power, and military power— 
among global actors. Each of these developments has important impli-
cations for law. 
 Globalization affects power in several distinct ways, all of which 
raise basic questions for law. Has globalization shifted power away from 
well-regulated actors to less regulated actors? How is globalization af-
fecting the relationship between power and legitimacy that is central to 
our tradition of constitutional democracy? And what are the powerful 
doing with their power? 
 Of course, political scientists also study power, as do philosophers. 
Both perspectives are represented in this issue.2 Law, however, has a 
 
 
* © 2013, Frank J. Garcia, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I would like to 
thank Sean Wall for his able research assistance. 
1 This symposium issue publishes the papers of a conference on this topic held at Bos-
ton College Law School on October 12, 2012. In addition to the authors included in this 
issue, David Benjamin, Gabor Rona, Newcomb Stillwell, and Gregory Teran also actively 
participated in the discussion. 
2 See generally Mathias Risse, A Précis of On Global Justice, with Emphasis on Implications 
for International Institutions, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1037 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
1037 (2013) (presenting a philosopher’s perspective on globalization and justice); Anne-
904 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
particularly complex relationship to power. Its role is not only to con-
strain power and to protect the vulnerable, but also to serve power, to 
channel power into socially productive forms, to accomplish the aims 
of the powerful, and to determine who has power, and who does not. 
I. Reflections on Globalization and Its Challenges 
 Before introducing the substantive contributions of our sympo-
sium participants, I want to offer a few preliminary reflections on the 
nature of globalization and the opportunities and challenges it creates 
for us. 
A. What Is Globalization? 
 One truth of the global era is that the role of the state is changing. 
How it is changing, however, is not always so clear. In some respects, 
globalization has arguably made states weaker or more vulnerable to 
global forces.3 Certainly the global financial crisis has shown us that no 
country or region, no matter how wealthy or powerful, can insulate it-
self from the effects of the global economy, and that no single country 
or region can effectively regulate the global economy.4 When it comes 
to matters of security, no country or region is immune from the global-
ized reach of criminality and terror, or from the destabilizing effects of 
regional conflicts, that the shifting global winds of ideology, power, and 
socioeconomic inequality inflame and intensify.5 Yet, in other respects, 
                                                                                                                      
 
Marie Slaughter, Keynote Address, Filling Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order, 54 
B.C. L. Rev. 919 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 919 (2013) (presenting a political 
scientist’s analysis of globalization). Other works also offer interdisciplinary approaches. 
See generally Global Justice and International Economic Law: Opportunities and 
Challenges (Chios Carmody, Frank J. Garcia, and John Linarelli eds., 2012) (compiling 
interdisciplinary essays on globalization, law, and justice). 
3 See Anthony McGrew, Globalization and Global Politics, in The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations 14, 16 ( John Baylis et 
al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) (“Some—the hyperglobalists—argue that [globalization] is bringing 
about the demise of the sovereign nation-state as global forces undermine the ability of 
governments to control their own economies and societies.”). 
4 Domenico Giannone et al., Market Freedom and the Global Recession, 59 IMF Econ. Rev. 
111, 128–29 (2011) (noting that deregulation of integrated credit markets made econo-
mies vulnerable to financial shocks); see also David A. Wirth, A World of Choices, 10 N.Z. J. 
Pub. & Int’l L. 1, 2–9 (2012) (evaluating the consequences of decentralization of power 
from states to other actors). See generally Frank J. Garcia, Between Cosmopolis and Community: 
Globalization and Global Justice, N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. (forthcoming 2013) (reviewing 
changes to global governance stemming from increased interdependence). 
5 S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess, The Lexus and the Olive Branch: Globalization, 
Democratization, and Terrorism, in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political 
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globalization may have strengthened the state. When we look at how 
difficult it continues to be for people to cross national boundaries, or 
how impervious many states remain to external human rights monitor-
ing and redress, we see that rumors of the death of the state have been 
greatly exaggerated.6 
 At the heart of these changes is the fundamental technological 
transformation characteristic of contemporary globalization. Many 
commentators argue that the most distinctive aspect of globalization 
today is the revolution in telecommunications, computing, and the In-
ternet that has essentially eliminated time and space as significant factors 
in many areas of human social interaction.7 
 The nature of our relationship to space and time is essential to 
questions of law and justice. As early as the eighteenth century, Im-
manuel Kant referenced the normative implications of time and space 
when he argued for cosmopolitanism on the basis that human beings 
live on a spherical planet.8 In making this observation, Kant was pre-
figuring globalization by reflecting on what it means to live on the sur-
face of a globe. 
                                                                                                                     
 If we consider globalization from the vantage point of time and 
space, then each phase in technological innovation—starting with the 
wheel and leading to the telephone, telegraph, and jet airplane—have 
steadily reduced the impact of time and space on human social interac-
 
Openness 116, 125 (Philip Keefer & Norman Loayza eds., 2008) (tracing the differential 
impact of increased trade and economic liberalization on the likelihood of terrorist activ-
ity). See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding 
Globalization (1999) (arguing that economic and ideological globalization results in 
winners and losers, with the losers having easier access to resources used for retaliation 
against the winners). 
6 Daniel Kanstroom, Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Di-
aspora, at x (2012) (“Reports of the death of the nation-state, in short, have been exag-
gerated, as have reports of the irrelevance of national borders. The importance of geo-
graphic space may have diminished somewhat . . . [b]ut the poor and the oppressed of the 
world encounter a tighter regime of state regulation—with fewer migration possibilities—
than many would have found in the past.”). 
7 See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 63–64 (1990) (de-
scribing globalization as interdependence without differentiation of time and space); Da-
vid Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change 240 (1989) (describing the “time-space compression,” where capital-
ism has brought people closer together and increased the pace at which things occur); 
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 & n.496 (2002) 
(describing Anthony Giddens’ analysis of globalization, time, and space). 
8 See Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in The Philosophy of Kant 430, 446 (Carl J. Frie-
drich ed. & trans., 1977). Kant argued in part for the universal right of decent treatment 
for all persons on the basis of the curved nature of the planet’s surface: “Since it is a globe, 
they cannot disperse indefinitely, but must tolerate each other.” Id. 
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tion.9 Globalization today has taken this even further. Kant no longer 
has to walk around the planet—he can, in a sense, walk straight through 
it, instantly. The elimination of time and space as barriers has massive 
consequences. If we consider everything from the global financial cri-
sis10 to the Arab Spring11 to the “Innocence of Muslims” debacle12 to 
the growing urbanization crisis in China,13 we see everywhere the effects 
of flows—human flows, information flows, capital flows, ideological 
flows— that are dramatically shaping the world and what is possible in 
14 
r of any one state— 
it.
 All of this, from the perspective of the state’s traditional role as 
residual guarantor of peace, security, and welfare, can be overwhelm-
ing. How can any single state cope with this barrage of interconnected, 
rapidly evolving, and highly volatile challenges? States must neverthe-
less try to regulate meta-territorial phenomena, such as cyberspace and 
the global financial market, through traditionally territorial tools, such 
as law. That is one reason why governance through international or-
ganizations and multilateralism—the traditional state response to col-
lective problems transcending the regulatory powe
has become so important in the global age.15 
  And yet it is also why we see the emergence of the “network 
state,” which Anne-Marie Slaughter, Manuel Castells, and others have 
                                                                                                                      
9 See David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Cul-
tur
uinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 
200
 Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. Int’l 
& C
ts stem-
min the 
Inte
, Global Justice and International Economic Law: Three 
Tak
izing the Environment, 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
Rev
e 58 (1999) (noting that the globalization and telecommunications revolutions have 
brought people into social realities they otherwise would not have known). 
10 See, e.g., Brian J.M. Q
8, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549, 550–55 (2009) (discussing the global reach and causes of 
the financial crisis of 2008). 
11 See, e.g., Sarah Joseph,
omp. L. Rev. 145, 145–46 (2012) (discussing the use of social media in the context of 
the Arab Spring uprisings). 
12 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Yelling ‘Fire’ in a Crowded Planet, Huffington Post (Sept. 25, 
2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-j-garcia/innocence-of-muslims-
protests_b_1912834.html (discussing the protection of speech amid global protes
g from the posting of an anti-Islamic video entitled “Innocence of Muslims” on 
rnet, as well as the regulatory challenges posed by the global reach of media). 
13 See, e.g., Nigel Harris, Immigration and State Power, Dev. Issues, Nov. 2009, at 1, 5. 
14 See Frank J. Garcia
es 137–99 (2013) (arguing that intensified global flows are transforming society, gov-
ernance, and regulation). 
15 See, e.g., id. at 173–80 (analyzing the shift toward meta-state governance in the global 
context); David A. Wirth, Global
. 353, 364–74 (1998) (evaluating the effectiveness of multilateral institutions con-
cerned with the environment). 
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written of so eloquently.16 In a world in which individuals and organiza-
tions can connect directly with their counterparts around the globe in-
stantly, cheaply, and without the mediation of the state’s apparatus for 
diplomacy and foreign relations, we have a fundamentally new regula-
tory environment. States will increasingly be judged by how successfully 
ey
 move has its consequences, and law 
is deeply implicated in all of them. 
th  surf and manage this web of networks.17 
  We also, however, see a disturbing rise in unilateralism, retrench-
ment, and the hardening of boundaries—perhaps an even more tradi-
tional state response to perceived external threats and a pervasive sense 
of insecurity.18 Needless to say, each
B. How Globalization Affects Law 
 Globalization affects law in at least four specific ways. First, global-
ization is changing the needs of clients. This distinguishes the legal aca-
demic inquiry into globalization from that of any other discipline. Law-
yers have clients. Our clients—be they corporations, states, international 
organizations, military decisionmakers, or private individuals—exist and 
work in a globalizing environment, and need their lawyers and their 
regulators to understand and respond to the demands of that environ-
ment. Lawyers are still performing traditional legal functions—advising, 
planning, structuring transactions, and resolving disputes—but in a rad-
ically new setting. In this new legal order, who is engaging our services 
and toward what ends?19 Do we have the right tools as lawyers to con-
                                                                                                                      
16 See generally Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (2d ed. 2000) 
(des
emacy 
in a 
l, 
lead
International Human Rights Law, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 
1123
cribing the growth of networks in society); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World 
Order (2004) (detailing Professor Slaughter’s network theory); Giles Scott-Smith & 
Moritz Baumagärtel, New Paradigms, Old Hierarchies? Problems and Possibilities of US Supr
Networked World, 48 Int’l Pol. 271 (2011) (describing a shift of power from nation-
states to networks). 
17 To be effective, regulatory decisions must increasingly involve the meta-state leve
ing to a system in which states may still have a preeminent role, but not the only role. 
See, e.g., Castells, supra note 16, at 500–09; Slaughter, supra note 16, at 14, 36–64. 
18 See Kanstroom, supra note 6, at x; Stephen Meili, U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the 
Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of 
, 1123, 1124–25 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1123, 1123, 1124–25 (2013). 
19 See Sara Dillon, Opportunism and Trade Law Revisited: The Pseudo-Constitution of the 
World Trade Organization, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1005, 1022–32 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1005, 1022–32 (2013) (discussing the opportunistic use of lawyers and trade law by 
corporations and nation-states). 
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ti e to channel and constrain power toward socially beneficial forms? 
How are we as lawyers doing with this solemn responsibility?
nu
aluating 
20 
 Second, the changing needs of clients are in turn changing the 
substance of the law. Law is inherently conservative and reactive. It re-
sponds to changes more than it initiates change.21 Insofar as globaliza-
tion and its associated technologies are changing what people do and 
how they do it, law itself is adapting and responding through new rules, 
institutions, practices, and procedures. Understanding and ev
these changes—and our own role in them as policymakers and reform 
advocates—is part of our core responsibility as legal scholars.22 
                                                                                                                      
20 Not well in some cases, suggest Professors Upendra Acharya and Sara Dillon, but 
better in others suggests Professor Stephen Meili. Compare generally Upendra D. Acharya, 
ela Papa, The 
Rise
 power 
acto
, 
Tra
Globalization and Hegemony Shift: Are States Merely Agents of Corporate Capitalism?, 54 B.C. L. 
Rev. 937 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 937 (2013) (discussing lawyers’ roles in 
obtaining sovereign consent critical to the development of international law and noting 
that these lawyers typically represent only Western education and ideologies), and Dillon, 
supra note 19 (critiquing trade lawyers for failing to adequately explain and evaluate the 
normative effects of trade laws), with Meili, supra note 18, at 1125–26 (noting that “lawyers 
play a critical role in shaping state power over refugee matters in the wake of globaliza-
tion” and arguing that U.K. refugee lawyers have been effective at getting international 
human rights norms applied to refugee law). Regardless of how one answers this question, 
there are certainly clear paths toward improvement. See David Wilkins & Miha
 of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global Governance, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 
1149, 1155, 1179 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1149, 1155, 1179 (2013) (citing 
the increase in professional self-regulation among corporate lawyers). 
21 Professor John Flood reminds us of this conservatism, but also of how much
rs such as globally engaged firms have to shape law and legal practice. See John Flood, 
Institutional Bridging: How Large Law Firms Engage in Globalization, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1087, 
1087, 1119–21 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1087, 1087, 1119–21 (2013). 
22 Professor Daniel Bradlow notes that although the governance tools may be new, our 
responsibility to assess them by both traditional and new criteria is not. See Daniel D. Brad-
low, A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Governance, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 971, 972–73, 1003 
(2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 971, 972–73, 1003 (2013); see also Frank J. Garcia
de, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade, 147–92 
(2003) (critically evaluating WTO special and differential treatment law as a failed re-
sponse—in its current form—to distributive problems in contemporary trade relations). 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 909 
 Third, globalization is changing the nature of regulation.23 Not 
only is the role of the state—the traditional source of regulation— 
volv
 give them avenues for 
development and contestation.27 As lawyers we are right in the middle 
e ing, but new sources of legal regulation are emerging. Globaliza-
tion is calling for new kinds of governance—sometimes, governance 
without government, at least without state governments in their tradi-
tional capacities—as new institutions are created or strengthened. This 
often raises serious questions of legitimacy and voice.24 
 Finally, I would return to law’s role as the protector of the weak.25 
If we accept the premise that the natural order is one in which the 
strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must,26 then 
law’s role is particularly complex, and particularly challenging. In our 
modern legalized era, the strong often do what they will through law, 
and do what they can to change law in their favor, whereas the weak 
must look to the same law to protect them and to
                                                                                                                      
23 See Franz Nuscheler, Global Governance, Development, and Peace, in Global Trends 
and Global Governance 156, 170–81 (Paul Kennedy et al. eds., 2002). This can also be 
called regulatory globalization, emphasizing the regulation of markets for goods, labor, 
capital, and services at new levels that require formalized interstate cooperation through 
new and powerful institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, and that may, in 
certain cases, transcend nation-state control to a significant degree, as with the European 
Union. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: 
From Government to Governance, 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 379, 379–85 (2001) (empha-
sizing the change in dynamics of law formation wrought by globalization); Jost Delbrück, 
Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets—Implications for Domestic Law—A European Perspec-
tive, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 9, 10–11, 17 (1993) (illustrating globalization as a 
change in the locus of regulation). This aspect of globalization often leads to complaints 
about globalization as insufficiently democratic. See Aman, supra, at 380–82, 390–92, 392–
96. 
24 This is at the heart of Professor Bradlow’s reform proposals. See Bradlow, supra note 
22, at 972–73, 984, 991; see also Garcia, supra note 14, at 194–99 (suggesting that the pro-
tect
009) (evaluating public 
poli
 and as Judge Phillip Weiner reminds us, the work of the law in this area is evolving 
but 
cussing the evolution of the crime of rape internationally). 
 See generally Flood, supra note 21 (discuss-
 
ion of the right to voice is one of the weakest elements in emerging global public law); 
cf. David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Stan-
dards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 79, 87–93 (2
cy implications of private voluntary standards as potential alternatives to governmental 
regulation). 
25 None are more in need of protection than populations vulnerable to rape in times 
of war,
far from finished. See generally Phillip Weiner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of 
Rape in International Criminal Law, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1207 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1207 (2013) (dis
26 This famous dictum comes from Thucydides’ account of an ultimatum that Athens 
issued to the people of Melos. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 360 
(E.V. Rieu ed., Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1954) (431 BC). 
27 The accounts of the roles of corporate and refugee lawyers by Professors Flood and 
Meili, respectively, aptly illustrate this dual role.
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of this, and globalization has only intensified our role.28 Globalization 
creates a larger space—a global space—in which this oldest of stories 
plays out, and in which issues of fundamental rights and distributive 
justice must be addressed on a planetary level.29 
II. The Symposium 
 The papers and keynote address comprising this issue explore 
each of these themes and relationships in greater depth. The Sections 
below provide brief summaries of the keynote address and each panel 
and highlight the contributions contained in this issue. 
A. Keynote Address: State Power in the New Global Order 
 There is perhaps no other U.S. scholar (and policy actor) more 
suited to open this discussion than Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and a long-
time student of the role of power in law and international relations. We 
were fortunate to have her deliver the keynote address, which discussed 
fundamental themes and built on her considerable contribution to the 
literature. 
 Professor Slaughter distinguishes between two different versions of 
power: the vertical and the horizontal.30 Vertical power is a hierarchical 
power—the traditional power of states and statecraft.31 Nation-states 
have traditionally operated on the national level through a vertical 
owep r structure, and to the extent possible in their international rela-
tions as well. Globalization, however, has brought to the fore another 
kind of power more suited to the new, flatter, and multi-polar environ-
ment: horizontal power. Horizontal power can be thought of as a web— 
it is the power of interconnectedness.32 The more central you are in the 
                                                                                                                      
ing the role of global law firms); Meili, supra note 18 (describing the role of refugee law-
yers). 
28 As Professor Dillon illustrates, scholars are equally in the middle of this volatile 
space. See generally Dillon, supra note 19 (arguing that lawyers are failing adequately to 
evaluate trade laws). 
29 Professor Acharya describes the long history of this process, and of the fundamental 
que
distributive justice issues in 
inte isse, supra note 2, at 1038–39 (arguing for a pluralist approach to 
inte ormative theory). 
generally Slaughter, supra note 2 (describing vertical and horizontal power and 
her tion of lawyers’ roles in the new globalized world). 
stions it raises about justice. See Acharya, supra note 20, at 937–38. See generally Garcia, 
supra note 14, at 273–341 (arguing for a global approach to 
rnational law); R
rnational n
30 See 
percep
31 Id. at 921–23. 
32 Id. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 911 
web, the ve with 
he
dern institutions and actors affect all stakeholders in the global 
con
 more connected you are, and the more power you ha
ot rs throughout the web.33 Thus, vertical power and horizontal pow-
er, respectively, can be distinguished in terms of “power over” versus 
“power with.”34 
 One consequence of globalization is that on an international level, 
nation-states must increasingly operate through the mode of horizontal 
power.35 This mode also brings law and lawyers to the fore, as law cre-
ates spaces for horizontal power and structures for interconnection and 
cooperation. Moreover, to be able to achieve desirable outcomes 
through horizontal power, someone must bring together actors to solve 
problems and mediate disputes. As lawyers are trained to think in terms 
f rio ghts and obligations from all sides of an issue, they are ideally 
placed to exercise power in a globalized world.36 
B. Panel I: Globalization, Deregulation, Power, and Agency 
 Our first group of papers, from the panel that Professor Paulo 
Barrozo moderated, delves into the exercise of power that Professor 
Slaughter so trenchantly analyzed. Together, these papers offer a criti-
cal exploration of the regulatory lacunae in contemporary globaliza-
tion, and the actors that exploit them to shape our global relations 
through their opportunistic exercise of power and influence. Put an-
other way, this is the problem of governance in a global age, when 
states may be losing power, international organizations may not be what 
they seem or what we wish them to be, and powerful actors stand ready 
to exploit new opportunities. 
 Professor Daniel Bradlow situates his contribution in the critical 
disparity between the effects of global governance decisions and the 
relative lack of voice of the governed.37 In A Framework for Assessing Glob-
al Economic Governance, he argues that because the decisions and actions 
of mo
e omy, they should be subject to some form of accountability.38 Al-
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 919–21. 
 and proposing a framework to evaluate global governance struc-
ture
 
Pan can seek third-party review of Bank loans). 
36 Slaughter, supra note 2, at 933–36. 
37 See generally Bradlow, supra note 22 (critiquing global governance for failing to allow 
stakeholder participation
s more effectively). 
38 See generally David A. Wirth, Essay, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model 
for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 Yale L.J. 2645 (1991) (proposing an 
independent accountability mechanism, which matured into the World Bank’s Inspection
el, through which members of civil society 
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though the international law applicable to global governance gives rise 
to some useful metrics for assessing global economic governance, they 
are not adequate for the range and impact of global economic govern-
ance activities and policies. Professor Bradlow instead offers a five-part 
test for evaluating global economic actors and activities, including a 
critical assessment of institutional goals and legal compliance, obser-
vance of best administrative practices, a comprehensive approach to 
stakeholder interests, and effective coordination with other governance 
organizations.39 The strength of this approach lies in its inherent plau-
sibility and pragmatic good sense, its grounding in the actual operation 
and dynamics of global governance institutions, and its radical incre-
mentalism—all hallmarks of careful regulation and regulatory evolu-
tion. 
 Professor Sara Dillon continues this focus on governance through 
scures the information necessary for us to effectively respond to trade’s 
negative effects.42 Put another way, effective global regulation requires 
a c
international organizations, but in a dramatically different vein. Build-
ing upon her earlier theory of “opportunism” in the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO),40 Professor Dillon argues in Opportunism and Trade 
Law Revisited: The Pseudo-Constitutionalism of the World Trade Organization, 
that the law of the WTO has been presented to the general public as 
something other than what it is—as something self-evidently benefi-
cial.41 Dillon charts a powerful and “opportunistic” alliance between 
corporate and financial interests, trade law scholars, and national gov-
ernments that together fails to serve the public interest, and in fact ob-
lear understanding of the nature and movements of power on a 
global level, which ultimately is the responsibility of the legal academy 
                                                                                                                      
39 Bradlow, supra note 22, at 983–93. 
40 See generally Sara Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO: Corporations, Academics and ‘Mem-
ber States,’ in International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline 
53 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (setting forth an opportunism theory of the WTO). 
According to Professor Dillon, this opportunism operates on several levels: first, in the 
motives of multinational corporations in seeking for their benefit to “constitutionalize” 
free trade doctrines in the form of trade agreements; second, among trade law scholars, 
who
 and financial actors within their own 
soci –68. 
te 19, at 1009–10; cf. David A. Wirth, Government by Trade Agreement, 
in J  Standing Apart: National Identities After NAFTA 111, 112–25 
(Do
1. 
 have built academic careers out of trade agreements without asking the difficult ques-
tions that the real-world effects and failures of these agreements raise; and finally, national 
governments, who have sought political capital by defending the “national” interest in 
WTO litigation, while in fact privileging corporate
oeconomic environments. See id. at 63
41 Dillon, supra no
oining Together,
rinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1997) (evaluating the role of the WTO and regional trade 
agreements in comprehensive global governance). 
42 Dillon, supra note 19, at 1021–3
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 913 
and the scholarly community as a whole.43 Professor Dillon reminds us 
that as scholars we play an important communicative role in the global 
governance system.44 
 In Power, Rules, and the WTO, Professor Fiona Smith argues that 
trade rules do in fact constrain power, but she makes this argument 
through a radically different avenue: the language of trade rules them-
selves.45 Although noting that in a globalized environment power inevi-
tably devolves to structures existing beyond the nation-state, Professor 
Smith challenges the conventional view that such power has inevitably 
lodged in sophisticated, highly complex international organizations like 
the WTO. In her view, the literature remains focused on the activities of 
institutions, on the assumption that power must be located in something 
that is dependent on human agency. But, Professor Smith asks, what if 
that is not the case? What if, instead, power is located in the semi-
autonomous nature of rules themselves? Interrogating the traditional 
positivist conception of power as expressed in Professor Martti Kosken-
niemi’s canonical work From Apology to Utopia,46 Professor Smith argues 
that the law is an important global actor in its own right. She demon-
strates how WTO treaty language shapes outcomes in subtle yet pro-
found ways, resisting or slowing down the oscillation between the apolo-
getic and utopian modes Koskenniemi characterized for international 
law. By doing so, Professor Smith emphasizes that lawyers too easily take 
for granted the nature of language itself, overlooking its capacity to 
channel power and to shape outcomes as a function of the words them-
selves. 
 In Globalization and Hegemony Shift: Are States Merely Agents of Corpo-
rate Capitalism?, Professor Upendra Acharya returns us to some of the 
themes that Professor Dillon sounded and proceeds directly to the 
heart of the debate over globalization as a servant of multinational cor-
porations.47 He argues that multinational corporations, and neither 
international organizations nor states, are the powerful actors in this 
new environment. He asserts that “pre-globalized” roles have been re-
                                                                                                                      
 Id. at 1009–10. 
44 Id. at 1035–36. 
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45 See generally Fiona Smith, Power, Rules, and the WTO, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1063 (2013); 36 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1063 (2013) (arguing that the language of the WTO and world 
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ote 20 (arguing that corporations have an unreasonable 
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46 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (2005) (using a positivists’ co
e international law, social theory, and political philosophy). 
47 See generally Acharya, supra n
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versed, with states now seeming to act as agents of corporate capitalism, 
whereas before corporations had been the agents of states.48 Mean-
while, states continue to derive their claims to legitimate sovereign au-
thority from people and the system of international law. Echoing Pro-
fessor Dillon, Professor Acharya argues that this “hegemony shift” has 
had repercussions throughout the system, as international organiza-
tions, including nongovernmental organizations, have also become in-
strumental in serving the needs of corporate capitalism. Although 
Acharya recognizes the positive contributions made by globalization 
and by corporate and international organization activity, he concludes 
that it is our responsibility—and, implicitly, law’s responsibility—to re-
sist such shifts in power when they act against fundamental human in-
terests. 
 Professor Mathias Risse concludes the panel’s examination with an 
explicitly normative contribution centered on the new possibilities that 
globalization has opened for traditional social justice concerns. In A 
Précis of On Global Justice, with Emphasis on Implications for International 
Institutions, Professor Risse argues that traditional modes of thought 
e-fits-all approach to answering normative questions. 
Instead, one must explore which particular obligations of justice apply 
to states and other institutions in particular normative situations. This 
has fundamental repercussions for the shape of “inter-national” law as it 
                                                                                                                     
about justice at the global level tend either to refrain from applying 
justice to states (contractarian and communitarian views) or else to ex-
tend its application to all people in addition to states (cosmopolitan 
views).49 Instead, Professor Risse rejects both of these approaches, ac-
knowledging the existence of multiple grounds of justice50 and defend-
ing a view he calls “pluralist internationalism.” Pluralist international-
ism accepts the centrality of states in the global architecture, but 
qualifies this acceptance by embedding the state into a broader model 
with its own principles of justice.51 Within this theory, one cannot as-
sume a  one-siz
 
n the 
glob
er recent call to embrace a plural approach to jus-
tice
rad-
ing ctive ownership of the earth. Risse, supra note 2, at 1038. 
48 See id. at 937–39. 
49 See generally Risse, supra note 2 (describing the traditional analysis of justice o
al level and rejecting the traditional view in favor of pluralist internationalism). 
50 Professor Amartya Sen’s recent book on justice is a passionate call to recognize such 
a plural approach. See generally Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009) (putting forth a 
pluralistic theory of justice). For anoth
 theory, see Garcia, supra note 14. 
51 The grounds that Professor Risse discusses are shared membership in a state, common 
humanity, shared membership in the global order, shared involvement with the global t
system, and humanity’s colle
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RIC
global governance by situating the rise of corporate lawyers in the con-
text of the global governance literature, and conceptualizing the rise of 
the
                        
s global law rather than the law of state relations—a move 
d ay since the end of World War II. 
 In particular, pluralist internationalism means that international 
institutions must be recharacterized as agents of justice, rather than as 
entities that merely advance particular state interests.52 Most impor-
tantly, in global governance today it falls to international organizations 
to create the context by which states are accountable to noncitizens for 
state effects on transboundary justice. Professor Risse argues that for 
the WTO (and its scholars), this means abandoning the view that the 
organization is solely about Member States and trade regulation, as it is 
embedded in a context that includes all persons involved in the global 
aditr ng system. 
C. Panel 2: Legal Practice and the Legal Profession in a Global World 
 The second group of papers, from the panel that Professor Gail 
Hupper moderated, casts a critical and scholarly eye on how the new 
global practice environment is changing lawyers and lawyering, and 
how lawyers are in turn changing the practice environment and global 
regulation itself. Among other implications, the papers together vividly 
demonstrate that in many countries there is no single legal “profes-
sion,” but rather a fragmented set of groups that play very different 
roles in global governance processes. How one should go about regu-
lating lawyers may therefore depend enormously on the particular 
group and their function both domestically and in the global space. 
 Professor David Wilkins and Mihaela Papa begin the inquiry by 
addressing conceptual and empirical concerns that the new global elite 
of transactional lawyers raise. In The Ris
B S: Implications for Global Governance, they note that over the last two 
decades, there has been a proliferation of corporate lawyers in emerg-
ing economies at a time when the role and impact of private actors on 
global governance—and the power shift this represents—is gaining in-
creasing attention in political, social, and legal scholarship.53 Professor 
Wilkins and Ms. Papa interrogate the conceptual issues this raises for 
 corporate legal elite in the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, 
                                                                                              
–50. 52 See id. at 1038, 1046
53 See generally Wilkins & Papa, supra note 20 (discussing the dramatic increase in the 
number of corporate lawyers in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) and the implications it has for globalization and the law). 
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China, and South Africa. They conclude that the importance of the 
role of governance—and its challenges—is real, but that there is also 
some evidence of professional self-regulation and social responsibility 
among this new class of global actors.54 
 Professor John Flood continues the conversation by focusing on 
one important subgroup within the corporate legal elite—the “Magic 
Circle” of U.K.-based global law firms. In Institutional Bridging: How 
Large Law Firms Engage in Globalization, Professor Flood notes that over 
the last 160 years, British corporate law firms have maintained a delib-
erately global outlook.55 Professor Flood introduces the literature of 
“Born Globals” into the analysis of law firms and legal practice to show 
efugees of global conflicts.57 
Asylum law vividly illustrates the ways that globalization creates tension 
be -
ort
how certain kinds of firms are constituted in a manner that enables 
them to adapt and thrive in a new global economy. Recent reforms in 
U.K. professional regulation that allow for “alternative business struc-
tures” with external investment in firms reinforce this competitive ad-
vantage, situating U.K. corporate law firms as powerful agents in the 
creation of a new global lex mercatoria. Professor Flood reminds us that 
as lawyers, we play multiple roles—as legal counselors and simultane-
ously as global actors whose professional and economic ambitions are 
themselves a global driver—the effects of which we must both study as 
scholars and regulate as policymakers.56 
 In U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Ac-
ceptance of International Human Rights Law, Professor Stephen Meili refo-
cuses us away from the heady world of the corporate elite and toward 
the lawyers doing the often thankless, yet essential, work of facilitating 
the resettlement of the most vulnerable—r
tween states, as international norms challenge state power by sup
p ing the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers, and states 
attempt to reassert their power over borders in a variety of ways. Profes-
sor Meili explores the ways that lawyers representing asylum-seekers in 
the United Kingdom navigate this space. He  argues that lawyers play a 
critical role in filling the void that globalization’s diminution of state 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 1179–82. 
55 See generally Flood, supra note 21 (discussing the global impact of U.K.-based law 
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 English law as a transnational framework 
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ra note 18 (analyzing the role of international human rights 
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57 See generally Meili, sup
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p er over refugee matters has created, and that they may even sup-
port a stronger role for national law to the extent that international 
human rights norms influence such law.
ow
 under conditions of uncertainty 
and time-sensitivity? In Train ates to Advise Commanders as 
Operational Law Attorneys, Lie el DiMeglio introduces us to 
e o
     
58 
D. Panel 3: Combat Strategies and the Law of War in the Age of Terrorism 
 The final set of papers, from the panel that Professor David Wirth 
moderated, evaluate power in its most explicit and violent forms: the 
use of military force in the plethora of armed conflicts that sadly have 
come to characterize this era of global ferment. The panelists ad-
dressed how the global War on Terror, with its new security threats and 
new technologies of warfare, requires new rules of engagement and a 
modified understanding of the law of war. 
 Globalization and the global war on terror may be new, but rape in 
imet s of war is sadly one of the oldest known crimes. Although it has 
long been a prohibited act in wartime, its occurrence remains perva-
sive, and until recently the elements of the crime had not been defined 
in international law. In The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in 
International Criminal Law, Judge Philip Weiner leads us through the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s landmark 1998 decision 
in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, where for the first time an international court 
defined rape.59 In the cases that followed, several international tribu-
nals provided varying opinions as to what constituted the elements of 
rape. With our increased awareness of the nature and extent of sexual 
violence in times of armed conflict, there have been major changes in 
these matters over the past forty years. Lawyers play a vital role in the 
continuing development of this critical area of global jurisprudence. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Richard DiMeglio poses a dramatically differ-
ent, but equally pressing, question: How would you advise a battlefield 
commander on the use of deadly force
ing Judge Advoc
utenant Colon
th perational environment in which life-or-death decisions on the law 
of armed conflict are made by military lawyers and the tactical officers 
they advise.60 He outlines the extensive training Judge Advocates re-
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ternationally through landmark tribunal decisions in various international tribunals). 
60 See generally Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. DiMeglio, Training Army Judge Advocates to 
Advise Commanders as Operational Law Attorneys, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1185 (2013); 36 B.C. Int’l & 
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ceive as well as the factors that should be considered when advising 
command personnel in a field situation characteristic of the global War 
on Terror. Although the execution of these principles may be far from 
perfect, the professionalism of military lawyers cannot be doubted. Nor 
can one doubt the importance of training systems in the United States 
and other countries, which ensure the best possible legal advice under 
some of the worst possible conditions. 
Conclusion 
 Together, our keynote address, authors, and panelists have docu-
mented the ways in which globalization is allocating and reallocating 
power among existing and new actors, as the international community 
attempts to understand and respond to both new and preexisting chal-
lenges—even to ancestral challenges in new guise. To a significant ex-
ent,t  the possibilities and hazards of power may not have changed. Nor 
have the roles of law and lawyers, even as the specific issues and distri-
butions reflecting the new global order have changed. Institutions still 
matter, rules still have effect, academic lawyers continue to grapple with 
this complex mixture, and lawyers are right in the middle of the nego-
tiations, conflicts, structures, and relationships that define this or any 
age. Whether it is in the exercise of national power, corporate power, or 
the power of law on behalf of the individual, lawyers ensure that rules 
are observed, and where necessary modified, as much as they facilitate 
the elision or circumvention of rules by the powerful. In fact, lawyers 
play a unique and multifaceted role in globalization—in addition to all 
of the above, we are ourselves global actors, who must both study and 
regulate our own impact. 
 Ultimately, it is my view that this is a hopeful message for society, 
and for the many students of law currently exploring what role law may 
have in a global future, and what their individual role may be. As our 
ymps osium authors collectively remind us, the rule of law means that 
we will continue to find lawyers at the heart of every defining conflict 
or relationship in our global society, and even our moments of disap-
pointment over particular shortcomings underscore a positive vision of 
what lawyers can contribute. Moreover, as Professor Fiona Smith re-
minds us, so long as we are using language to express and mediate 
power—the essence of law itself—there is the intrinsic possibility for 
power to be restrained or channeled into responsible, even progressive 
                                                                                                                      
mally and informally before they are placed in the field to advise commanders making life-
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forms. Globalization, and the challenges of a global economy and glob-
al security threats may push us into extreme situations where power is 
least effectively regulated and violence—both physical and economic— 
seemingly inevitable. But as long as we bring lawyers and language into 
these situations, there is reason to hope for productive outcomes. 
 On behalf of the faculty who planned this Symposium—Professors 
Ault, Barrozo, Hupper, Kanstroom, Perju, McMorrow, Wirth, and my-
self—I want to recognize the prodigious efforts of our combined law 
review staff who have labored with love to produce this Symposium is-
sue. We also wish to thank the Clough Center under the leadership of 
Professor Perju for its support, and our new Dean, Vincent Rougeau, 
for his encouragement, international vision, and leadership. Welcome 
to this conversation. 
